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Abstract: Cyber-physical system (CPS) has operated, controlled and coordinated the physical systems 
integrated by a computing and communication core applied in industry 4.0. To accommodate CPS 
services, fog radio and optical networks (F-RON) has become an important supporting physical cyber 
infrastructure taking advantage of both the inherent ubiquity of wireless technology and the large 
capacity of optical networks. However, cyber security is the biggest issue in CPS scenario as there is a 
tradeoff between security control and privacy exposure in F-RON. To deal with this issue, we propose a 
brain-like based distributed control security (BLCS) architecture for F-RON in CPS, by introducing a 
brain-like security (BLS) scheme. BLCS can accomplish the secure cross-domain control among 
tripartite controllers verification in the scenario of decentralized F-RON for distributed computing and 
communications, which has no need to disclose the private information of each domain against cyber-
attacks. BLS utilizes parts of information to perform control identification through relation network and 
deep learning of behavior library. The functional modules of BLCS architecture are illustrated including 
various controllers and brain-like knowledge base. The interworking procedures in distributed control 
security modes based on BLS are described. The overall feasibility and efficiency of architecture are 
experimentally verified on the software defined network testbed in terms of average mistrust rate, path 
provisioning latency, packet loss probability and blocking probability. The emulation results are obtained 
and dissected based on the testbed. 
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I. Introduction 
Along with the rapid evolution of IoT and industrial applications, developing 5G systems and then 
evolving into beyond 5G (B5G) have become an inevitable trend which interconnects hundreds of 
terminals from physical environment with large bandwidth to address the burgeoning machine-to-
machine communications. In such scenario, as the bridge between physical world and cyber world, the 
cyber-physical system (CPS) has operated, controlled and coordinated the physical systems integrated 
by a computing and communication core, which is successful applied in internet industry or industry 4.0 
[1-3]. In order to accommodate CPS services, the radio and optical networks (RON) has become one of 
the most important supporting physical cyber infrastructures carrying for CPS which can take advantage 
of both the inherent ubiquity of wireless technology and the large capacity of optical networks [4]. RON 
can provide the low latency and high bandwidth communication and rapid calculation for industry system 
control and orchestration [5].  
Not only considering the accessibility of the network, the cyber security has also drawn much attention 
 from academia and industry for CPS in all walks of life [6], especially against the increasing cyber-
attacks and their sophisticated behaviors. The centralized control approach in cyber usually encounter 
with the threats of collapse and information leakage disastrously, resulting in poor scalability, low 
reliability and high response time. [7]. The distributed fog-RON (F-RON) for multiple domain can avoid 
or reduce the risk compared to centralization which safeguards the privacy of each domain, while much 
lower delay communication should be addressed in F-RON [8]. However, as disposing of the unified 
controller, distributed architecture must face the trusted issue among multiple controllers with the 
information of their own domains. Once one of the controllers is malicious intruded by cyber-attacks, 
the privacy information of each other controller may be exposed for distributed computing and 
communications [9]. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between security control and privacy exposure in F-
RON for CPS operation. For all we know, trusted control security against cyber-attacks in distributed 
way hasn’t been addressed so far in cyber layer of CPS without private exposure.  
On the other hand, artificial intelligent (AI) technology can deal with an amount of big data that come 
from different sources of information to protect the CPS from zero-day cyber-attacks and predict the 
future attackers’ misbehavior [10]. However, few researches consider the security issue if the controller 
has been broken through by attacks. Recently, brain-like computation and communication [11, 12] is a 
promising technology in artificial intelligence area as a viable solution with associative recalling the 
relationship like brain’s central nervous system using multiple knowledge bases. Therefore, it is 
significant to apply brain-like technology to strengthen the distributed cyber security in F-RON for CPS.  
The efficient service accommodation of F-RON based on machine learning has been presented in our 
previous work [13]. In this paper, we propose a novel brain-like based distributed control security (BLCS) 
architecture for F-RON in cyber physical systems, by introducing of a brain-like security (BLS) scheme. 
Instead of disclosing the private information of each domain, BLCS can accomplish the secure cross-
domain control among tripartite controllers’ verification in the scenario of decentralized F-RON for 
distributed computing and communications. BLS utilizes parts of information to perform control 
identification through deep learning of behavior library. The overall feasibility and efficiency of 
architecture with BLS are experimentally verified on the software defined network testbed. The rest of 
the article is organized as follows. Functional modules of BLCS architecture are illustrated including 
various controllers and CPS platform. Then we discuss the interworking procedures for control security 
in BLCS. BLS scheme is presented based on the architecture. The testbed is established and analyzed 
with numerical results.  
II. Security Challenge in CPS 
In CPS system, distributed controllers have private data for the entire network, such as topology 
information. If one of the controllers is compromised, the attacker can obtain the private data of CPS 
system and then use the data to destroy the normal operation of the entire system. In this case, the privacy 
leakage problem aroused is extremely serious. Traditional ways of sharing private data provide multiple 
opportunities for malicious attacker. The zero-day attack provides a clear sample of the attacks.  
To construct trusted connection, the controller cannot complete mutual trust with no private data. 
Providing all the private data to the authentication will cause a security leak once it is infected. Providing 
partial information is a promising solution. Security authentication and route provisioning in case of 
privacy protection are challenging in CPS system due to the difficulties in using partial information for 
security authentication. Therefore, new technologies are needed to provide intelligent control over CPS 
for consistent and effective security authentication as well as route provisioning. 
 III. Brain-Like based Distributed Control Security Architecture 
The traditional pattern of network control is approved in centralized cyber center. Though unified 
control has the characteristics of maintainability, responsiveness and convergence, in case of malicious 
attacks, the centralized control center will face the risk of collapse disastrously. Additionally, the 
centralized center is difficult to prevent the intentional deception with peer-peer relationships in 
distributed CPS networks. On the other hand, the distributed network also may expose the private 
information of other domain for the routing and path provisioning convergence [14]. Note that, there is 
a tradeoff between security control and privacy exposure in F-RON for CPS management. Therefore, we 
present brain-like based distributed control security architecture to implement distributed trusty and 
security for cyber control and industry service provisioning in CPS, which is shown in Fig. 1. Instead of 
unified management in network, the proposed architecture removes central control function towards 
distributed domain, which splits up the attacked risk and reduces control latency and connection cost to 
enhance the CPS’s service responsiveness. Without revealing all the personal information, BLCS 
architecture can perform the distributed cross-domain control using brain-like computing which can 
associate the relationship among partly information with knowledge bases to achieve the trust routing 
and control. 
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Fig. 1 The architecture of brain-like based distributed control security in F-RON for CPS.  
A. Network Architecture  
BLCS architecture in F-RON for CPS is illustrated in Fig. 1. The physical entities such as robotic arm 
and camera are interconnected with distributed multi-domain fog wireless and optical network, which is 
deployed radio, optical and fog computing resources respectively and called as cyber plane. Here, every 
 domains are software defined by the controllers in a centralized way. Aiming to realize the distributed 
control security, the secure controller in BLCS are interworked with SDN controllers (SC) to constitute 
a distributed control plane deployed with brain-like computing in order that each industrial production 
service in CPS can be accommodated with secure cross-domain mixed communication path efficiently. 
In such control plane, brain-like security scheme is addressed with relation network among partial 
information to prevent deliberate deception based on the security controller. Each controller (e.g., SC1) 
only manages its own optical domain network (e.g., domain 1) so as to safeguard its private information. 
Meanwhile, according to relation network built by brain-like learning, each controller maintains the 
partial virtual topology and routing behavior of other domain (e.g., domain 3) to verify that the executed 
computation results whether to correct in SC (e.g., SC3). The motivations for secure control has been 
driven by two forces. Firstly, the BLCS adopts brain-like computing mechanism in CPS in order to 
perform the secure anonymous distributed control without private information disclosure addressed by 
relation network speculation, which promotes the cyber control security with high privacy protection and 
saves the network cost effectively. Secondly, once relation network has been integrated, the associate 
relationship will be much clearer using brain-like computing to enhance the network security with the 
increasing of the services, which accommodate the secure CPS service efficiently with rapid response 
and global optimization of optical, wireless and calculation resources.  
B. Functional model for BLCS  
In order to implement the secure distributed control, the SDN controllers are used to cooperate with 
each other and secure controller for trusted cross-domain path provisioning with wireless, optical and 
computing resources in F-RON. Note that the controllers are extended to support BLCS and setup the 
functional entities are illustrated in Fig. 1.  
In SDN controller, cyber information of its own domain is gathered in physical information module, 
while other domain’s partly virtual topology and routing behavior of should be sustained in virtual 
information module to be primed for route verification. The controller model is the core engine of SDN 
controller such NOX and opendaylight to orchestrate and manage the F-RON network in a unified 
manner. Cross-domain path calculation is executed in PCE base on an integrated graph of F-RON 
networks with secure constraints, which including inter-domain and intra-domain computation with 
brain-like credible identification in secure controller. Parser performs continuous radio and optical 
spectrum allocation and decides the routing path using OpenFlow, which contains the messages of packet 
in, stats reply, flow modification and features reply. It can control the spectrum bandwidth and center 
frequency elastically for CPS services, through setting all the related antennas and optical switches on 
the calculated path or network. 
The trust management is a vital module in the architecture shown in Fig.1. Trust management 
mechanism enables the controller capable to sustain trust and mitigate the risk of communication and 
information sharing with malicious controller. The trust management model consists of three modules 
including the knowledge base (KB) module, brain-like learning module, and evaluation module. The KB 
is updated periodically based on the statistics about the state collected from the physical cyber. The BLS 
module builds the identification-status-behavior relational network (ISB-RN) of knowledge bases, 
realizing trust calculation based on partial information. The evaluation module calculates the controller's 
honesty, reliability, and collaboration through the ISB-RN so as to determine whether a controller is 
trusted to execute cyber operation. 
The core functional entity is secure controller in trust management model. In secure controller, the 
 information of network status such as virtual topology, routing behavior and controller identification 
should be collected as knowledge bases for brain-like computing and verification. The brain-like learning 
module can address the secure controller access control and computation authentication. Initially, all the 
controllers are identified with distributed consensus. They can be in a distributed secure network way as 
the foundation of credible route. The relation network module verifies the trusty and security of inter-
domain path calculation among other controller so as to validate the results dependable with the learning 
from knowledge of partly information. The neural network (NN) can perform the deep learning to help 
the relation network establish.  
IV. Cooperation Procedure for Brain-Like Cross-Domain Security 
In CPS, the SCs are automatically working and cooperating with each other to execute a certain task 
assigned from physical entities. However, the SC is vulnerable to be attacked, so that a malicious SC can 
gain access to private data in the communication channels. Processing and storage of the untrustworthy 
SC result in unpredictable loss or changes to data, thereby compromising other controllers. Therefore, a 
controller should be properly identified and validated to be confirmed whether the controller is an 
appropriate correspondent before starting the interaction with it. In our scheme, the SC only needs to 
send partial information that does not involve private information to the target controller for trusted 
authentication and secure routing. Based on the partial information, the destination controller associates 
with the meaning represented by this information, thereby verifying the identity of the sender. This 
protects the sender from transmitting its private information to the cyber.  
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Fig. 2 Illustration of brain-like learning scheme.  
Fig. 2 shows how the scheme works. The controllers are divided into two roles including the leading 
secure controller and the receiver. As the leader of multiple controllers, the secure controller periodically 
synchronizes the network information to realize the consistency among multiple controllers. In addition, 
mutex lock is used to ensure synchronization when updating security controller and distributed controller. 
The scheme is applied to the control plane and transport plane of optical networks shown in Fig.2. 
Here, the transport plane is tightly coupled to the physical layer of the optical network, which includes 
spectrum contiguity and spectrum continuity constraints. The integrated information can be 
supplemented based on partial information under two constraints of optical network. New spectrum 
information will build the new relation with existing partial information in knowledge base. Then, the 
relational network of established spectrum information can be used for security certification. The specific 
process of security authentication is as follows: SC2 receives the authentication request and the partial 
 information (i.e., the situation of occupied spectrum) of SC1. It can be determined that the slots with 
orange color are occupied due to the relation of spectrum contiguity and spectrum continuity in S-RN. 
SC2 can confirm whether the candidate resources from request have been occupied already and then 
judge whether SC1 is trusted. 
In the control plane, the first step is to provide knowledge bases input for the relation network (RN) 
model, and the RN builds the identification-status-behavior relational network (ISB-RN) between 
knowledge bases. There is a general undetermined interaction in the knowledge bases. For instance, the 
processes interact universally such as control and calculation. Interactions follow different types of 
relations in different spaces. To obtain the complex relations, RN must be able to reason with the existing 
databases and then learn to infer unknown relations. Thus, we can provide identification, status and 
behavior description directly into RN. We use tags to mark these inputs which indicate their relative 
position in the support set, and process this information independently using the same Long Short-Term 
Memory (LSTM). We notice that such setting invokes minimal prior knowledge like a particular identity 
will be associated with a state or an operation. After processing the input, in the multi-layer perception 
(MLP) of the RN, the layers take relational reasoning to be the process of understanding the ways in 
which information are connected using such understanding to accomplish the construction of the ISB-
RN. In fact, these layers provide an architecture on which the model can learn to partition information 
and learn to calculate the interaction between the partitioned information. For instance, the calculation 
unit calculates the angle at which the motor rotates, while the motor rotates to control the robotic arm. 
Here, the robotic arm adjusts the posture and completes the automobile manufacturing. So calculation 
unit, motor and automobile manufacturing will build a relationship among them.  
After the above process, the SC waiting for verification sends part of the information to the destination 
SC to verify whether it is a trusted object. We process the partial information with LSTM in the way of 
the first step. Then, recalling relations of ISB-RN in associative fashion to confirm whether to trust. The 
relationship lookup is first performed, and the relationship between the partial information sent by the 
controller and each location in the ISB-RN is compared. The relationship recursive search is performed 
in the ISB-RN until the relationship of the partial information is found. Then, the authentication of partial 
information can be verified with associative recall. According to associative recall, we confirm it as a 
trusted SC if there is no exception. Finally, the untrusted SCs will be detected, while we will use the 
result for secure routing. When one physical object sends a request to establish a trusted route to the 
optical domain and the computing domain, it can avoid untrusted SCs and use the greedy algorithms for 
routing safely in trusted domains.  
In the proposed model, we illustrate the complex relationships required for trust and routing 
provisioning across domains of the CPS infrastructure and services. Establishment of ISB-RN and trusted 
routing authentication is explained with an example.  
Example: Iidentify={i1, i2, …, in } denotes the identification base, Bbehavior ={ b1, b2, …, bn} is the behavior 
base, and S={s1, s2, …, sn } represents the status base. Each trusted information is defined as combination 
of Iidentif, Bbehavior and Sstatus, which are constrain of ISB-RN. We assume that SC1, SC2 are trusted 
controllers, and SC3 is a malicious SC. When SC1 needs to verify its legal identity to SC3. It has to send 
partial non-sensitive information to SC3, which not only protects the identity of SC1 but also performs 
trusted authentication. And based on this part of the information, SC3 make an associative recall 
judgment whether SC1 is credible. The flow steps in the distributed control security and trusted routing 
authentication process between SCs shown in Fig. 2 is elaborated as below: 
 Create ISB-RN of knowledge bases: In light of knowledge bases, the RN model constructs the ISB-
RN as shown in Fig. 3. The relation instance is the result of relational reasoning in RN. For example, i1 
is associated with i2, i3, s1 and b2, just like, under the status of robot i2 and conveyor i3, a motor i1 receives 
the feedback of the computing domain after the request, and adjusts the speed action b2 in state s1. When 
new affairs occur, the ISB-RN will update periodically.  
Send partial information: The verifier sends a small portion of the information that is not private but 
sufficient for verification. For instance, the partial information may be part of event information, part of 
spatial-temporal information, even part of attribute information. Here, we take event information as an 
example. We can define event information Ievent={Pid, t, lloc, atype} in CPS, where Pid is the physical event 
identifier, t, l, atype are the occurrence time, location and affairs type, respectively, the event information 
included in knowledge base suggestively describes whether the SC is trusted. We assume SC1 sent the 
information Isc1={t, lloc, atype} related its identification to make SCs of another domain trust it.  
Carry out associative recall: Recursive association search is performed in ISB-RN in light of received 
partial information Isc1 for trusted verification. When SC3 received Isc1, SC3 processes this information. 
First, according to Isc1, event Ievent is recalled, then the handler of the event is associated, and finally, the 
SC1 is confirmed the credible. At the same way, SC3 sent its information Isc3 to SC1 to verify whether 
SC1 can trust SC3. When SC1 receives the information from SC3, in the ISB-RN, some abnormal 
behaviors of SC3 are retrieved, which may cause error handling of the sender information. Therefore, 
SC3 is judged to be the malicious controller. Hence, SC1 repeats the process with SC2 and find SC2 
trusted. 
Create the trusted routing connection: When it is verified the trust, create a trusted connection between 
SC1 and SC2. Once locating and avoiding malicious nodes, we use the greedy algorithm to calculate 
routes in the trusted SC domain as the final routing result, further improving routing security.  
V. Brain-like Security for CPS 
For the first time, we design a cross-domain distributed security scheme based on brain-like learning. 
The model foundation is based on the RN. The design goal behind BLS is to constrain the functional 
form of the neural network such that it can capture the core common attributes of relations and enable 
the formation of associative data structures. It is built upon the RN model and able to store presented 
relation patterns and recall missing patterns in an associative brain-like fashion. 
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Fig. 3 The architecture of relation network model. 
A. Relation Network 
 Relation extraction is prerequisite for BLS. Therefore, we first need to design the RN model with a 
structure prepared for information relational reasoning. The RN consists of two parts as shown in Fig. 3: 
feature extraction MLP 𝑓∅ and feature relation mapping MLP 𝑔𝜃. The RN architecture has the capacity 
to compute relations, just as CNNs have the capacity to reason about spatial and the recurrent neural 
networks have the capacity to reason about sequential dependencies. We applied the RN to information 
authentication control which hinges on relational reasoning. The learning model differs from the 
traditional neural network in the way that it can train the model without labeling, address the evolution 
in network structure, and infer the indirect relationship between the data. To ensure that the relationship 
is correctly extracted, we utilize multi existing knowledge bases to heuristically align with information.  
The simplest form of the RN model is the following composite function. In Equation (1), the functional 
form indicates that BLS considers the underlying relationship between knowledge bases. It means that 
BLS does not necessarily know which relation actually exists, nor the actual implication of any specific 
relation. Hence, BLS has to learn to reason the existence and implication of relations.  
Here the input is sets of identification base I={i1, i2, 𝑖𝑚…, in }, behavior base B={ b1, b2, bp…, bn}, and 
status base S={s1, s2, sk…, sn }. In Equation (1), 𝑓∅  and 𝑔𝜃  are MLPs with parameters ∅ and θ , 
respectively, and the parameters are learnable synaptic weights such that RN can be end to end 
differentiable. We also use LSTM with 32 units to process I, S, B as input. The output of 𝑔𝜃 is referred 
to as a “relation”; therefore, the mission of RN is to infer the ways in which im, bp, sk are relational. RN 
uses 𝑔𝜃 to compute relations of information. This can be deemed to as a single function operating on a 
batch of im, bp, sk pairs, where each batch is a particular Identification-Behavior-Status pair. 
B. Associative Recall 
Retrieving all information from a small amount of information according to ISB-RN in an associative 
brain-like fashion, thereby preventing the risk of privacy information leakage [15]. A two-layer memory 
network is constructed to realize our goal, including the input layer and the relation memory layer. The 
input layer is used to input relation vector of the RN. The relation memory layer is used as storage of 
information from the input layer, relation vector information can be stored in this layer. 
 In the relation memory layer, different sub-networks are used to store the different sets of relation 
groups, and neural nodes are used to indicate the distribution of data’s relation. The input relations are 
stored in the weight of such nodes. The relation vector with a relation group label is input into the system. 
According to the label, the model addresses the corresponding sub-network in the relation memory layer, 
and incrementally learns to add the new input to corresponding sub-network. If the input relation vector 
does not pertain to any group existing in the relation memory layer, the new input vector will be turned 
into the first node of a new relation group which will be added to the relation memory layer.  
For retrieving all relations, the relation memory is supposed to recall relation vector stored in model 
so that incomplete information input can be recognized. When presenting partial information, if the 
relation of the partial information is available, then we will find the corresponding node in the memory 
layer. If the information’s relation is unavailable, the k-nearest neighbor rule will be used to determine 
which relation vector belongs to. At test time, one is given partial information, which is used to iteratively 
address and read from the memory looking for relational information to retrieve all relations. At each 
step, the collected information from the memory is cumulatively added to the original query to build the 
BLS(R) = 𝑓∅(∑ 𝑔𝜃
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑖𝑚 , 𝑏𝑝, 𝑠𝑘)) (1) 
 context for the next round. At the last iteration, the final retrieved information and the most recent query 
are combined as the final result. 
VI. Performance Analysis and Results Discussion 
The efficiency of the proposed BLCS architecture is evaluated on our SDN testbed, which consists of 
30 physical objects, wireless domain, optical domain and computing domain, which communicate with 
distributed controllers to access various service. This scenario is emulated and established on our testbed 
which has a multi-core server with 8 physical 2.20GHz CPU cores and 2 NVIDIA GTX TITAN XP GPU 
cores, and the code is based on TensorFlow 1.13.1 in Ubuntu 18.04.2. To train the proposed model, 
routing trusted authentication requests from physical objects with discrete event simulation are 
considered for accessing services. All these routing trusted authentication requests along with knowledge 
bases are given as input to the proposed RN model for security path provisioning. The RN model is run 
for 2000 epochs using the feature set mentioned above. Once the security route is decided, the proposed 
scheme is evaluated on the basis of performance metrics such as average mistrust rate, path provisioning 
latency, packet loss probability, and blocking probability.  
Impact on Average Mistrust Rate: To prove the robustness of our algorithm, the average mistrust rate 
is emulated under the condition of a high proportion of malicious controllers. Fig. 4(a) shows that BLCS 
can maintain a low average mistrust rate, even though a collusion situation occurs in such case. The 
variations in average mistrust rate with respect to the ratio of malicious controllers are shown in Fig. 4(a). 
As seen in this figure, the scheme without BLCS is much higher than the proposed scheme, and it rises 
faster as the ratio of malicious controller increases. This is because establishing a connection directly 
without performing trusted authentication increases the probability of connecting to a malicious 
controller, as opposed to the proposed scheme. 
Impact on Path Provisioning Latency: Fig. 4(b) shows the impact on path provisioning latency with 
increasing traffic load. As can be seen from the figure, the proposed scheme decreases the path 
provisioning latency. This is because the continuously updated ISB-RN becomes clearer as the network 
load increases, and the trusted authentication and path provisioning can be performed more quickly. This 
means that the controller can directly determine which specific domain to authenticate and route in line 
with ISB-RN when processing the request. It is not blindly interacting with other controllers and maintain 
trust with highly reliable controllers, thus reducing path provisioning latency. 
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Fig. 4 (a) Average mistrust rate, (b) path provisioning latency, under different traffic load. 
Impact on Packet Loss Probability: Fig. 5(a) shows the impact on packet loss probability with 
increasing traffic load in the CPS. It can be inferred from Fig. 5(a) that the packet loss probability for the 
proposed scheme is minimal compared to the scenario without the proposed scheme. The proposed 
scheme assigns the routes using the BLCS in such a way it decreases the packet loss probability, further 
improving the distributed control security, which proves the efficiency of our scheme. 
 Impact on Blocking Probability: Fig. 4(d) shows the variations of the overall blocking probability with 
respect to the traffic load. This figure shows that the proposed scheme also reduces the blocking 
probability compared to the scheme without BLCS. It can be inferred from Fig. 4(a), Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 
5(b) that the proposed scheme selects trusted controllers as well as perform faster path provisioning 
during the requests processing, resulting in the reduction of blocking probability. 
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Fig. 5 (a) Packet loss probability and (b) blocking probability under different traffic load. 
VII. Conclusion and Future work 
This article presents a novel brain-like based distributed control security architecture in fog radio and 
optical networks for CPS, which can solve the cyber security issue without the privacy exposure. The 
functional entities of the architecture and interworking procedure in secure control mode are presented 
and investigated. The performances are demonstrated on the testbed for secure distributed control. We 
also assess its performances in the scenario with heavy traffic load and compare it with the other scheme. 
Numerical results show that BLS scheme can locate malicious controllers and security routing, while 
reduce the average mistrust rate, path provisioning latency, packet loss probability and blocking 
probability. In the future, we will research more sophisticated optimization techniques along with 
unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning based BLCS. These can further enhance the security, 
reliability, and accuracy of rapidly growing CPS architectures. 
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